没人会认为伊朗是模范国际公民，或者很快会成为模范世界公民，但对伊朗核野心的这一看法构成了对形势的一个根本性误解。不管伊朗在过去进行了多少工程研究，不管最近它已经发展出多少燃料制造和导弹发射能力，它从未接近于真的决定制造核武器。
伊朗真的有核野心吗?对于本月在维也纳达成的伊朗和P5+1(联合国[微博]安理会五大常任理事国——中国、英国、法国、俄罗斯和美国加上德国)的协议，唯一的遗憾之处是它没有在十年前就签字画押。外交尝试用了多年的时间才获得胜利，在此期间，中东经历了各种各样本可避免的对峙，丧失了许多安全合作机会。
从2003年到2006年，伊朗向任何愿意倾听的人表明态度：它将同意现在的协议的所有关键内容，包括阻止其获得制造核弹所需的铀和钚的措施以及确保能充分提前预警可能的违反情况的严格的检查机制。它所需要的全部回报——当然除了作为前提条件的取消制裁之外——是正式承认其铀“浓缩权利”。
在2003—2004年间的对欧谈判中，伊朗自愿冻结了当时规模甚小的核浓缩项目，期待谈形成一个完整的协议。伊朗还宣布它愿意接受“附加协议”，接受比标准情况下深入得多、严格得多的国际原子能机构监督。
这些承诺结束于2005年，原因是欧盟在美国的支持下坚持要求伊朗完全放弃铀浓缩。这一立场无视核不扩散条约所明确承认的“不可剥夺的权利”(在理想世界中你也只能期待这么多了)。核不扩散条约规定，签署国可以进行各阶段核燃料循环，只要出于和平核能用途目的。
如果当时西方就准备满足于事实遏制伊朗的核计划，而不是毁掉其核计划中所有的敏感成分，那么当时就有可能达成协议。而事实上，在2006年初，国际危机集团(InternationalCrisis Group)提出了一份全面的“推迟有限核浓缩活动”方案，该方案包括了如今在维也纳签署的协议的所有关键内容。
国际核不扩散和裁军委员会联职主席加雷斯-埃文斯从德黑兰、纽约和其他地方与伊朗高级官员的无数小时的建设性对话出发，我对于该方案能够打破僵局非常有信心。它具备了有效妥协的所有正确要素。但美国拒绝与伊朗展开任何层面的对话，而欧盟只说不听，因此我们的努力付诸东流。
伊朗人永远不会接受他们所认为的核不扩散条约下的二等地位。直到美国总统奥巴马政府意识到这一点，并在2011年开始非正式渠道的直接对话，这一方案才获得了取得进展的可能。关键在于承认伊朗的荣誉感必须得到顾及。
美国国会、以色列和阿拉伯世界的维也纳协议批评者总是认为伊朗没有荣誉可言。他们认为伊朗永远在偏执地试图制造核武器，其领导人之所以签署这个对伊朗今后15年的核计划添加约束的协议，只是为了缓解让伊朗经济透不过气来的各项制裁。批评者指出，伊朗是在隐忍，它必将再次撕毁协议。
没人会认为伊朗是模范国际公民，或者很快会成为模范世界公民，但对伊朗核野心的这一看法构成了对形势的一个根本性误解。以我比大部分批评者多得多的与伊朗高官的对话经验看，伊朗——不管它在过去进行了多少工程研究，不管最近它已经发展出多少燃料制造和导弹发射能力——从未接近于真的决定制造核武器。
伊朗一直对跨越红线所暗含的风险十分警觉。它知道，它将受到武装远比自己强的以色列的攻击(不管有没有美国支持);它知道，地区中的逊尼派力量可以很快行动起来用它们自身的核武器制造一颗“什叶炸弹”;它知道，它可能面临更加严厉的国际制裁。还有一个不应该轻易忽视的因素——犬儒主义批评家经常忽视它：伊朗领导人出于宗教立场一再拒绝大规模杀伤性武器。
于是，问题在于伊朗为何要在如此长的时间里铤而走险，摆出一副显而易见的突破驾驶，惊动西方、以色列和阿拉伯邻国?我认为，答案在于无法抵抗的国家骄傲——伊朗人民渴望证明伊朗是一个不可小觑的力量，是一个拥有惊人技术实力的国家，并且伊朗承受国际羞辱的忍耐力是有限度的。
伊朗人还深刻地记得美国中央情报局和英国情报部门1953年颠覆民选的摩萨德(MohammadMosaddegh)政府。他们还记得西方长期支持他们所讨厌的国王沙哈(Shah);记得西方支持20世纪80年代悍然向伊朗宣战的伊拉克(即使是在萨达姆˙侯赛因使用化学武器后)。他们也记得美国总统小布什将伊朗贴上“邪恶轴心”的标签，即使其在阿富汗问题上与美国合作。
不难理解，许多人不会相信伊朗的诚意，因为伊朗的谈判风格——不管是温和派还是强硬派——绝对算不上坦诚直接，私人原因和公共理由交织在一起，让人为无法判断真实意图。但维也纳协议理应获得广泛支持，因为其他办法——最好情况是继续尖锐地区对立，最坏情况是军事冲突——更加糟糕。
事实上，有很强的理由可以相信该协议抓住并反映了伊朗以及国际社会的真实利益。它保护了已经颓势尽显的全球核不扩散机制的完整性，也带来了更广泛的地区安全合作希望。明智外交永远胜过蛮力。
Project Syndicate版权所有，www.project-syndicate.org
【原文】
An Iran Deal Ten Years Late
By Gareth Evans
ROME – The only thing to lament about theagreement reached by Iran and the P5+1 (the UN Security Council’s fivepermanent members – China, Britain, France, Russia, and the United States –plus Germany) in Vienna this month is that it was not signed and sealed adecade ago. In the years that it has taken for diplomatic sanity to prevail,the Middle East has endured myriad avoidable tensions and lost opportunitiesfor security cooperation。
From 2003 to 2006, Iran made clear toanyone willing to listen that it would agree to all the key elements of therecent deal, including measures to block uranium and plutonium pathways to abomb and obtrusive monitoring mechanisms to ensure ample advance notice of alikely breakout. All it needed in return – beyond, of course, the lifting ofsanctions as implementation proceeded – was formal recognition of its “right toenrich” uranium。
In discussions with the European Union in2003-2004, Iran voluntarily froze its then-minimal enrichment program, pendingnegotiation of a full accord. Iran also declared its willingness to apply the“additional protocol,” allowing for much more far-reaching and stringentmonitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency than is called for understandard arrangements。
Those commitments ended in 2005, owing tothe continued insistence by the EU, backed by the US, that Iran abandon uraniumenrichment entirely. This stance disregarded the “inalienable right,” clearlyacknowledged in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (as much as one might wishotherwise, in an ideal world)， of NPT parties to engage in all stages of thenuclear fuel cycle as part of a peaceful nuclear energy program。
If, at that time, the West had beenprepared to settle for effectively containing Iran’s nuclear program, ratherthan destroying every last sensitive component of it, a deal would have beenpossible. And, indeed, in early 2006, the International Crisis Group publisheda comprehensive “delayed limited enrichment” proposal that included all of thekey features of the deal that has now been signed in Vienna。
I am confident, on the basis of many hoursof productive dialogue with senior Iranian officials in Tehran, New York, andelsewhere, that this proposal could have broken the deadlock. It had all the rightelements of an effective compromise. But with the US not talking to Iran at anylevel, and the EU talking but not listening, the effort went nowhere。
The Iranians were never going to acceptwhat they perceived as second-class status under the NPT. It was only when USPresident Barack Obama’s administration acknowledged that, and commenced directback-channel talks in 2011, that progress became possible. The key was therecognition that Iran’s sense of honor had to be accommodated。
Critics of the Vienna deal in the USCongress, Israel, and the Arab world tend to assume that Iran has no honor.They believe that Iran has always been hell-bent on building nuclear weapons,and that its leaders signed the deal, which imposes limits on the ry’snuclear program for 15 years, only to relieve the enormous sanctions pressurenow crushing its economy. Iran is biding its time, the critics ge, and willinevitably attempt to break out again。
While no one should be under any illusionthat Iran has been a model international citizen, or is likely to become oneany time soon, this perception of the ry’s nuclear ambitions involves afundamental misreading of the dynamics in play. My judgment, based on moredialogue with senior Iranian officials than most of the critics have conducted,is that Iran – whatever engineering research it may have carried out in thepast, and whatever fuel-making and missile-delivery capabilities it may havedeveloped more recently – has never been close to deciding actually to buildnuclear weapons。
Iran has always been keenly aware of themultiple risks involved in crossing that red line. It knows that it would faceattack by a much more heavily armed Israel, whether supported by the US or not;that Sunni powers in the region could move quickly to er a “Shia bomb”with their own nuclear weapons; and that additional crushing internationalsanctions could be imposed. And there is another factor that should not beinstantly dismissed, as it usually is by cynical critics: Iranian leaders’repeated strong rejection of weapons of mass destruction on religious grounds。
The question, then, is why has Iran walkedthe precipice for so long by building a visible breakout capability bound tospook the West, Israel, and its Arab neighbors? The answer, I believe, isoverwhelmingly national pride – its peoples’ desire to demonstrate that Iran isa power to be reckoned with, a ry that has impressive technical prowess,and that there are limits to its willingness to suffer internationalhumiliation。
Iranians vividly remember the overthrow,orchestrated by the CIA and British intelligence, of the elected government ofMohammad Mosaddegh in 1953. They remember the West’s prolonged support for thehated Shah, and for Iraq in its brutal war with Iran in the 1980s, even afterIraqi leader Saddam Hussein employed chemical weapons. And they remember whenUS President George W. Bush labeled their ry part of an “axis of evil,”despite its cooperation with the US in Afghanistan。
It is understandable that many will notreadily be persuaded of Iranian sincerity, not least because the nationalnegotiating style – among moderates and hardliners alike – tends to be anythingbut frank and direct, with private reason often accompanied by public thunderthat makes it hard to assess real intent. But the Vienna agreement deserveswide support, and not just because the alternatives – continuation of acuteregional tension at best, and catastrophic military conflict at worst – are sounappealing。
In fact, there is every reason to believethat the agreement captures and reflects the real interests not just of Iran,but also of the international community. It keeps intact a globalnon-proliferation regime that has been showing signs of falling apart, andgives new hope for wider regional security cooperation. Intelligent diplomacybeats brute force every time。
Gareth Evans was Foreign Minister ofAustralia 1988-96, co-chaired the International Commission on NuclearNon-Proliferation and Disarmament 2009, and is author of The Responsibility toProtect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All and co-author of NuclearWeapons: The State of Play 2015.
原标题：伊朗真的有核野心吗？
